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In this paper, we provide a test of the sustainability of the Spanish government deficit 
over  the  period  1850-2000,  and  examine  the  role  played  by  monetary  and  fiscal 
dominance in order to get fiscal solvency. The longer than usual span of the data would 
allow us to obtain some more robust results on the fulfilling of the intertemporal budget 
constraint than in most of previous analyses. First, we analyze the relationship between 
primary surplus and debt, following the recent critique of Bohn (2007), and investigate 
the possibility of structural changes occurring along the period by means of the new 
approach  of  Kejriwal  and  Perron  (2008).  The  analysis  is  complemented  in  two 
directions:  (i)  performing  Granger-causality  tests  in  order  to  distinguish  properly 
between a fiscal dominant and a monetary dominant regime; and (ii) presenting the 
impulse-response functions of debt to innovations in the primary surplus, through the 
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1. Introduction 
The role of fiscal policy goes beyond the traditional stabilization function. Questions 
such as the balancing of budget deficits, the interactions between monetary and fiscal 
policies,  and  the  fiscal  discipline  required  in  monetary  unions,  have  been  also 
intensively  discussed  in  the  last  decades.  In  particular,  one  of  the  main  problems 
concerning  fiscal  authorities  is  the  sustainability  of  government  deficits,  which  is 
related to the issue of long-run solvency. The public deficit can be sustainable if the 
government can borrow. However, if the interest rate on the government debt exceeds 
the growth rate of the economy, debt dynamics would lead to an ever-increasing ratio of 
debt to GDP. The dynamics of debt accumulation could be stopped only if the ratio of 
the budget deficit to GDP would turn to be a surplus, or if seigniorage were allowed for. 
 
The  usual  procedure  in  most  of  the  empirical  contributions  on  the  long-run 
sustainability  of  budget  deficits  consists  of  testing  the  government’s  intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC); a non exhaustive list would include, among others, Hamilton 
and  Flavin  (1986),  Trehan  and  Walsh  (1988,  1991),  Haug  (1995),  Quintos  (1995), 
Martin  (2000)  or  Bajo-Rubio,  Díaz-Roldán  and  Esteve  (2008,  2009).  The  results, 
however,  are  sometimes  inconclusive  due  to  differences  in  the  econometric 
methodology, the particular specification of the transversality condition, and the sample 
period  used.  A  common  criticism  to  most  of  the  available  literature  is  that  the 
econometric  procedures  used  require  a  large  number  of  observations,  which  is  not 
usually the case in most tests of the IBC; an exception is Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and 
Esteve (2010). 
 
  On  the  other  hand,  the  traditional  macroeconomic  analysis  assumes  that  the 
fiscal authority sets primary surpluses in order to assure fiscal solvency, for any path the 
price level could take. In this way, the monetary authority is expected to set the price 
level, without facing any constraint; whereas fiscal authority would adjust, so that the 
budget surplus path would be endogenous. This scenario is referred in the literature as 
the Ricardian or “monetary dominant” (MD) regime. However, a new approach has 
emerged in the 1990s,  which assumes that  fiscal authorities are able to set primary 
surpluses that follow an arbitrary process, not necessarily compatible with solvency. In 
such a context, the budget surplus would be exogenous, and the endogenous adjustment 
of the price level would be required in order to achieve fiscal solvency. Hence, in this 2 
case the monetary authority could only control the timing of inflation. This is the so-
called non-Ricardian or “fiscal dominant” (FD) regime, and the literature developed on 
these assumptions is referred as the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). The FTPL 
builds on the contributions of, among others, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford 
(1994, 1995, 2001), and Cochrane (2001, 2005); a survey is provided in Carlstrom and 
Fuerst  (2000),  and  some  critical  appraisals  of  the  theory  can  be  found,  e.g.,  in 
McCallum  (2001)  or  Buiter  (2002).  The  empirical  evidence  regarding  the  FTPL, 
however, is not too abundant; see, e.g., Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2009) and 
the references therein. 
 
In  this  paper,  we  will  try  to  analyze  whether  the  empirical  evidence  would 
support the sustainability of government deficits, as well as the role played by monetary 
and fiscal dominance in order to get fiscal solvency, for the case of Spain over the 
period 1850-2000. In a companion paper (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve, 2010) 
we investigated this issue through the estimation of a cointegration between government 
expenditures and revenues derived from the IBC, and then analyzed the possibility of 
non-linear  behaviour  of  fiscal  authorities  through  the  estimation  of  a  threshold 
cointegration  model.  In  the  present  paper,  however,  we  will  first  analyze  if  public 
finances are sustainable by examining instead the relationship between primary surplus 
and debt, and then investigate how this fiscal sustainability is achieved: i.e., through the 
endogenous adjustment of the primary budget surplus (in an MD regime), or through 
the endogenous adjustment of the price level (in an FD regime).  
 
Regarding the empirical methodology, we will analyze the relationship between 
primary surplus and debt in the line of Bohn (1998), but incorporating the later critique 
to previous tests on sustainability using cointegration techniques, recently developed by 
this same author in Bohn (2007). Given the long-run span of the data, we will test for 
the eventual presence of structural breaks in the estimated relationship between primary 
surplus and debt, making use of the new approach of Kejriwal and Perron (2008a,b) to 
testing for multiple structural changes in cointegrated regression models. In addition, we 
will also perform Granger-causality tests between these two variables, since the above 
method might not be able to distinguish properly between an FD and an MD regime 
(see below). Finally, in order to check the robustness of our results, we will present the 3 
impulse-response functions of debt to innovations in the primary surplus, following the 
approach of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001).   
 
As mentioned before, the empirical analysis will be performed for the case of 
Spain over the period 1850-2000. Recall that a common criticism to most tests of the 
IBC is that the econometric procedures used require a large number of observations. 
Accordingly, the longer than usual span of the data (i.e., 150 years) will allow us to 
obtain some more robust results than in most of previous analyses. On the other hand, 
the Spanish case can be of interest given the permanent difficulties experienced when 
balancing the government budget across those years. For most of this period, and until 
the fiscal reform of 1978, public revenues proved insufficient to finance even small 
amounts of public expenditures, so deficits became chronic, leading the government to a 
continuous resource to seigniorage.  
 
In section 2, we describe the underlying theoretical framework. Next, in section 
3 we introduce the empirical methodology, briefly discuss our dataset, and present the 
results. Finally, the main conclusions are summarized in section 4. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
As we have seen, according to the traditional analysis, prices would be determined by 
monetary policy. On the contrary, the FTPL develops the idea that sometimes, in order 
to guarantee fiscal solvency, monetary policy would be addressed to accommodate the 
path  of  expenditures  and  revenues  chosen  by  the  government,  even  at  the  cost  of 
generating inflation. An antecedent of this claim can be found in Sargent and Wallace’s 
(1981)  contribution,  where  the  interaction  of  fiscal  and  monetary  variables  in  the 
financing of deficits, through taxes and seigniorage, was already analyzed. In this way, 
fiscal solvency can act as a restriction on the policy followed by a central bank.  
 
In order to describe the two possible ways of achieving fiscal sustainability, we 
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b      (1) 4 
where b and s denote, respectively, the public debt and primary surplus, both as ratios to 
GDP; E is the expectations operator; and x and r stand, respectively, for the rate of 
growth  of  real  GDP  and  the  real  interest  rate,  both  assumed  to  be  constant  for 
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b         (3) 
i.e., solvency requires that the government must run expected future budget surpluses 
equal, in present-value terms, to the current value of its outstanding debt. 
 
Notice that, in equilibrium, the fiscal solvency condition holds under both the 
MD and FD regimes; the difference between the two regimes lies in how solvency is 
achieved. According to the MD regime approach, the price level would be determined 
in the money market, following the quantity theory of money, and the primary surplus 
would adjust endogenously to satisfy the IBC. In terms of equation (3), s would be set 
to meet a given b, independently of the price level.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  when  the  FD  regime  prevails,  the  primary  surplus  is  set 
exogenously  by  the  government,  regardless  of  the  level  of  public  debt.  In  this 
framework, the price level would adjust in order to assure the fulfilment of the IBC. 
And the main implication for fiscal policy would be that government solvency turns to 
be a sufficient condition for price stability.  
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where B, P, and y denote, respectively, the nominal value of public debt, the price level, 
and real GDP. Then, given B, y, and s, P would “jump” to satisfy (3’). In other words, if 
the market believes the government’s commitment when setting s, a value of P will be 
set so that B was not excessive and (3’) could be satisfied. 
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  The underlying assumption of the FTPL is that there are interactions between 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  In  this  line,  Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  (2000)  show  the 
restrictions that the government’s budget may place on monetary policy. If the policy 
regime can be qualified as an MD or as an FD regime, depends on the particular role 
played by either the monetary or the fiscal authority. So, whether monetary or fiscal 
policy determines prices involves an assumption about which policymaker will move 
first, i.e., the central bank or the fiscal authority. In terms of the game theory approach, 




3. Empirical methodology, data, and results 
As shown in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Esteve (2009), the empirical literature has 
usually made use of two approaches to test for the prevalence of monetary dominance 
versus fiscal dominance: 
(i)  The backward-looking approach (e.g., Bohn, 1998), so that, in a Ricardian 
regime, an increase in the previous level of debt would result in a larger 
primary surplus today; i.e.,  t t s b ∆ → ∆ −1 . 
(ii)  The forward-looking approach (e.g., Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001), so 
that, in a Ricardian regime, a larger primary surplus today would lead to a 
reduction in the future level of debt; i.e.,  1 + ∇ → ∆ t t b s . 
 
According to the first approach, one should estimate a cointegration relationship 
between the primary surplus and the (lagged) level of debt, both as ratios to GDP: 
t t t v b s + β + α = −1         (4) 
where νt denotes an error term. In this equation, a positive and significant estimate of β 
would be a sufficient condition for solvency, indicating that the government satisfies its 
present-value  budget  constraint.  In  addition,  an  estimated  0 > β   would  indicate  the 
prevalence of an MD regime, and an estimated  0 ≤ β  the prevalence of an FD regime.  
 
  Testing whether  0 > β  from the estimation of (4) or, alternatively, whether β′ = 1 
from the estimation of a cointegration relationship such as: 
revt = α′ + β′expt + εt        (5) 6 
where  expt  and  revt  denote  the  ratios  of  the  government’s  total  expenditures  and 
revenues  to  GDP,  and  εt  is  an  error  term,  are  customary  approaches  to  test  for  the 
sustainability  of  public  finances.  However,  this  kind  of  assessments  of  fiscal 
sustainability based on unit root and cointegration tests have been recently criticized by 
Bohn (2007), on the grounds that such tests are incapable of rejecting sustainability. 
Specifically, Bohn derives the following three propositions: 
(i)  If bt is integrated of order m for any finite m≥0, then bt satisfies the transversality 
condition, and bt and st satisfy the IBC. 
(ii)  Suppose expt∼I(mG) and revt∼I(mT), possibly with different orders of integration 
and not necessarily cointegrated, where ∆bt = expt − revt; then bt∼I(m) with m ≤ 
max(mG, mT) + 1, so the transversality condition and the IBC hold. 
(iii)  If bt and st follow an error-correction specification of the form st − ρbt−1 = zt, and 
zt is integrated of order m for some ρ < 0 such that  ( ] r + ∈ 1 , 0 ρ  where r is a 
constant interest rate, then bt satisfies the transversality condition and the IBC 
holds. 
 
  We use data on total revenues, total (i.e., inclusive of debt interest) expenditures, 
primary (i.e., excluding interest payments) budget surplus, and total gross debt, all of 
them as percentages of GDP, for the Spanish central government over the period 1850-
2000. The data sources are Comín and Díaz (2005) for the public sector variables, and 
Prados de la Escosura (2003) for GDP. The time evolution of the total and primary 
government surplus (rev−exp and s, respectively) is shown in Figure 1, and that of the 
total gross debt (b) in Figure 2. In the next paragraphs, we will briefly discuss the main 
developments of the Spain public finances between 1850 and 2000; a more detailed 
account of the evolution of the Spanish public sector over this one-and-a-half-century 
period can be found in Comín (1995, 1996). 
 
The behaviour of the Spanish public sector was mainly characterized along most 
of  the  period  by  the  pervasiveness  of  budget  deficits.  This  was  the  result  of  small 
amounts of expenditures dictated by an insufficient level of revenues, given the inability 
of governments, representing the wealthy classes of the society, to affect their particular 
interests. In general, the main task of the Spanish public sector was providing a high 
degree  of  protection  and  regulation,  in  order  to  favour  some  particular  groups  and 7 
sectors,  rather  than  satisfying  collective  needs  (such  as  infrastructures,  or  social 
expenditures). In fact, Spain had to wait until the restoration of democracy after 1977, 
and especially the integration in the now European Union (EU) in 1986, to enjoy a 
public sector comparable to that of the rest of Western Europe. 
 
On the other hand, given the above features, government debt has frequently 
served to finance not deficits, but rather public expenditures. As such, and at least until 
the  1960s,  their  interest  payments  have  represented  a  dead  weight  on  government 
expenditure.  This  can  be  seen,  e.g.,  in  the  significant  difference  between  total  and 
primary government surplus in Figure 1. The maximum levels of government debt can 
be found at the mid 1870s, following a period of political instability after the so-called 
“Glorious  Revolution”,  when  it  amounted  to  more  than  150%  of  GDP,  and  at  the 
beginning of the 20th century, following the last wars in Cuba and the Philippines, to 
reach more than 125% of GDP. Later on, only at the end of the Spanish Civil War and 
in the mid 1990s (just before the fiscal consolidation that allowed Spain to join the 
European monetary union) the ratio debt-GDP reached significant, though lower, levels, 
reaching around 70% and 60%, respectively. For most of the period, inflation was used 
to  reduce  the  real  value  of  indebtedness.  Only  after  1982,  budget  deficits  were 
increasingly financed in a more orthodox way; and, finally, from 1993 on government 
deficits  financing  by  the  central  bank  was  explicitly  forbidden  according  to  the 
provisions of Article 104a of the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
In order to examine the three Bohn’s propositions, we begin by testing for the 
order of integration of the variables bt, expt, and revt, using the tests of Ng and Perron 
(2001). These authors proposed using the tests statistics 
GLS Z M α  and 
GLS
t Z M , which are 
modified  versions  of  the  α Z   and  t Z   Phillips-Perron  tests;  and  ADF
GLS,  a  modified 
version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Such modifications improve the tests with 
regard to both size distortions and power. According to the results in Table 1, the null 
hypothesis of no stationarity cannot be rejected, independently of the test, for the three 
series  in  levels;  and  the  presence  of  two  unit  roots  is  clearly  rejected  at  the  1% 
significance level. Therefore, the three series would be concluded to be I(1), and the 
first two propositions of Bohn (2007) would hold. 
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  Next, we estimate the error-correction specification analogue to (4): 
∆st = ω + δ(L)∆bt−1 + ρ(st−1 − α − βbt−2) + γ(L)∆st + ηt     (6) 
where ηt is an error term. The results are shown in Table 2 and, as can be seen, the 
error-correction coefficient is estimated at −0.21, and the long-run coefficient β at 0.02. 
The two estimates are significant at the 1% level. Accordingly, the third proposition of 
Bohn (2007) would hold, and public finances would have been sustainable over the long 
run. In particular, the adjustment of the primary surplus-GDP ratio to a given change in 
the debt-GDP ratio would have had an average half-life of about three years
1. These 
results would confirm those found using the more traditional approach, i.e., from the 
estimation  of  a  cointegration  equation  such  as  (5),  in  Bajo-Rubio,  Díaz-Roldán  and 
Esteve (2010).  
 
Notice that, while it allows obtaining estimates that are more robust, using long 
spans of data increases the likelihood of finding instabilities in the estimated equations. 
Hence, we will test for the stability of equation (6) using the tests recently proposed by 
Kejriwal and Perron (2008a,b), who provide a comprehensive treatment of the problem 
of testing for multiple structural changes in cointegrated systems.  
 
Specifically,  these  authors  propose  three  types  of  test  statistics  to  test  for 
multiple breaks in cointegrated regression models: 
a)  First, a sup Wald test of the null hypothesis of no structural break (m = 0) versus 















where SSR0 and SSRk denote, respectively, the sums of squared residuals under 
the  null  hypothesis  of  no  breaks,  and  under  the  alternative  hypothesis  of  k 
breaks; λ={λ1, ..., λm} is the vector of breaks fractions defined by λi=Ti/T for 
i=1,..., m; and Ti are the break dates. 
                                                 
1   Computed as  ( ) ( ) β ˆ 1 log 5 . 0 log − ,  where  β ˆ is the  estimate of β in equation (6); in our case, 
−0.21. 9 
b)  Second, a test of the null hypothesis of no structural break (m = 0) versus the 
alternative hypothesis that there is an unknown number of breaks given some 
upper bound M (1 ≤ m ≤ M): 




1 max max  
c)  In addition to the tests above, Kejriwal and Perron also propose a sequential 
procedure that not only enables detection of parameter instability but also allows 
a consistent estimation of the number of breaks, i.e., a sequential test of the null 
hypothesis of k breaks versus the alternative hypothesis of k+1 breaks: 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) { } 1 1 1 1
τ 1 1 / ˆ ,..., ˆ , τ , ˆ ,..., ˆ ˆ ,..., ˆ sup max | 1
ε ,
+ −
Λ ∈ + ≤ ≤ − = + k k j j T k T k j T SSR T T T T SSR T T SSR T k k F
j
 
  where  ( ) ( ) { } ε ˆ ˆ ˆ τ ε ˆ ˆ ˆ ; τ 1 1 1 ε , − − − − − ≤ ≤ − + = Λ j j j j j j j T T T T T T ,  and  the  model  with  k 
breaks is obtained by a global minimization of the sum of squared residuals. 
   
The results of applying the Kejriwal-Perron tests to the relationship given by 
equation (6) are shown in Table 3, where up to three possible breaks have been allowed 
for (the results did not change if up to five breaks were allowed instead). As can be 
seen, none of the tests proves to be significant and the sequential procedure selects no 
break point, which would point to a stable long-run relationship between the primary 
surplus and debt to GDP ratios over the whole period.  
 
Recall that, in addition to implying fiscal solvency, a positive estimate of β in 
equation  (6)  would  indicate,  according  to  the  backward-looking  approach,  the 
prevalence  of  an  MD  regime.  However,  there  is  a  possible  ambiguity  here,  since  a 
positive estimate of β is strictly compatible with the presence of both an MD and an FD 
regime. That is, in an MD regime we would observe that an increase in debt in period t 
would  lead  to  a  larger  primary  surplus  ex-post;  i.e.:  1 + ∆ → ∆ t t s b ,  which  implies  an 
estimated  0 > β .  Yet,  in  an FD  regime,  a  decrease  in  the  expected  primary  surplus 
would  lead  to  a  fall  in  the  current  debt  ratio,  through  a  price  increase;  i.e.: 
t t t b s E ∇ → ∇ +1 ,  which  also  implies  an  estimated  0 > β .  For  that  reason,  we  will 
complement  the  above  analysis  with  Granger-causality  tests  between  the  primary 
surplus and debt to GDP ratios. 
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In particular, according to Sims, Stock and Watson (1990), if two I(1) series Xt 















− − − −   (7) 
with an analogous representation holding for Yt as dependent variable. Then, to testing 
for Granger-causality, the null hypotheses would be: (i) γ1 = 0, for the absence of long-
run causality; and (ii) α2i = 0, for the absence of short-run causality. And the standard F 
test can be used to test for Granger-causality in the short and in the long run. 
   
The results of the Granger-causality test for the variables primary budget surplus 
and government gross debt are presented in Table 4. We report F statistics on the null 
hypotheses γ1 = 0 and α2i = 0, from the estimation of equation (7) with st and bt−1 
alternatively as dependent variables. Up to three lags of the first difference of each of 
these variables have been included, and the number of lags has been chosen using the 
Akaike information criterion. The results in Table 4 indicate the presence of both long-
run and short-run Granger-causality from primary surplus to debt, which would point to 
the prevalence of an FD regime over the period of analysis.  
 
Finally, in order to offer a more complete picture, we present the results from 
applying  the  so-called  forward-looking  approach,  following  Canzoneri,  Cumby  and 
Diba (2001). According to these authors, in an MD regime a positive innovation in the 
primary surplus pays off some of the debt, so the future level of debt would fall. In turn, 
in an FD regime a positive innovation in the primary surplus should lead to a higher 
future level of debt, via a lower price level. Notice, however, that a possible ambiguity 
can also emerge here since, even if a positive innovation in the primary surplus leads to 
a reduction in the future level of debt, this could be compatible with an FD regime. In 
particular, if innovations in the primary surplus were negatively correlated with future 
surpluses, the future level of debt would fall through a rise in the price level; and such a 
case could be justified since a higher surplus today might reduce the need of future 
surpluses.  
 
The  impulse-response  function  of  the  debt-GDP  ratio  to  innovations  in  the 
primary surplus-GDP ratio, from an estimated VAR in these two variables, is shown in 11 
Figure  3  together  with  ±2  standard  errors,  over  a  10-year  horizon.  The  VAR  was 
estimated with one lag and a constant; up to five lags were tested, and the optimal lag 
order was selected using the Akaike information criterion.  As can be seen in the figure, 
the debt-GDP ratio exhibits a small, but positive, response following an innovation in 
the surplus-GDP ratio, and then decreases to move gradually toward zero. Accordingly, 
this approach would also indicate that an FD regime would have prevailed over the 
period of analysis.  
 
The results of this section would agree and confirm for a longer period extending 
from 1850 to 2000, those previously obtained by Sabaté, Gadea and Escario (2006). 
Using  a  different  approach  (in  particular,  from  the  estimation  of  a  stationary  VAR 
model), these authors also found the prevalence of an FD regime in the Spanish case for 




In  this  paper,  we  have  tried  to  provide  some  additional  empirical  evidence  on  the 
sustainability of government deficits, as well as on the role played by monetary and 
fiscal dominance in order to get fiscal solvency, for the case of Spain over the period 
1850-2000. More specifically, we have tried to find if public finances were sustainable, 
and  then  investigated  how  this  fiscal  sustainability  was  achieved:  i.e.,  through  the 
endogenous adjustment of the primary budget surplus (in an MD regime), or through 
the endogenous adjustment of the price level (in an FD regime). An important point to 
be stressed is that our dataset extends over 150 years, which should allow us to obtain 
some more robust results as compared to other previous analyses. 
 
First, we have analyzed the sustainability of government deficits by examining 
the relationship between primary surplus and debt, following the recent critique of Bohn 
(2007) to previous tests on sustainability using cointegration techniques. We found that 
the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  was  integrated  of  order  one,  as  they  were  the  ratios  of  total 
government expenditures and revenues to GDP too. In addition, we estimated an error-
correction  relationship  between  primary  surplus  and  debt  (both  as  ratios  to  GDP), 
finding a significant error-correction coefficient, and a long-run coefficient positive and 
also  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%  level.  Accordingly,  the  three 12 
propositions derived by Bohn (2007) would hold, and public finances would have been 
sustainable over the long run, with an estimated adjustment of the primary surplus-GDP 
ratio to a given change in the debt-GDP ratio with an average half-life of about three 
years. Given the long-run span of the data, we also tested for the eventual presence of 
structural  breaks  in  the  estimated  relationship  between  primary  surplus  and  debt, 
following the new approach recently proposed by Kejriwal and Perron (2008a,b), but 
the results pointed to a stable long-run relationship between the primary surplus and 
debt to GDP ratios over the whole period.  
 
Even though these results could be taken prima facie as evidence in favour of 
the  prevalence  of  an  MD  regime,  in  fact  the  above  method  might  not  be  able  to 
distinguish properly between an FD and an MD regime. That is, in equilibrium, the 
fiscal solvency condition holds under both the MD and FD regimes, and the difference 
between them would come from how fiscal sustainability is achieved, i.e., through the 
adjustment of either the primary surplus or the price level in the MD and the FD case, 
respectively. For that reason, in order to distinguish between the two regimes, we next 
performed  Granger-causality  tests  between  primary  surplus  and  debt.  The  results 
showed the presence of both long-run and short-run Granger-causality from primary 
surplus to debt, which would point to the prevalence of an FD regime over the period of 
analysis.  
 
Finally, we also presented the impulse-response function of debt to innovations 
in the primary surplus, following the approach of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001). 
Again, since the debt-GDP ratio showed a small, but positive, response following an 
innovation  in  the  surplus-GDP  ratio,  to  decrease  later  gradually  toward  zero,  this 
approach would also indicate that an FD regime would have prevailed along the period 
analyzed.  
 
  Summarizing  our  findings,  the  Spanish  government  deficit  would  have  been 
sustainable  along  the  period  1850-2000,  since  the  condition  of  fiscal  solvency  was 
fulfilled. In addition, the relationship between primary deficit and debt was found to be 
stable over the long run, and the whole period can be characterized as one of fiscal 
dominance.  In  other  words,  fiscal  authorities  would  have  set  budget  deficits 
exogenously, and the endogenous adjustment of the price level was required in order to 13 
achieve  fiscal  solvency,  so  that  monetary  policy  was  subordinated  to  the  needs  of 
financing the budget deficit. Nevertheless, as shown in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and 
Esteve (2010), if the deficit was above a certain threshold (estimated at around 4.5% of 
GDP),  budget  deficits  would  have  been  cut  in  order  to  assure  their  long-run 
sustainability. 
 
Overall, the picture that emerges would be typical of a less developed country, 
with a rather undisciplined public sector, unable to collect revenues enough to finance 
even small amounts of expenditure, and compelled to engage in inflationary financing 
of the deficit (Comín, 1995). This was the case of Spain over most of this period, since 
the development of a public sector comparable to that of the rest of Western Europe can 
be dated only following the restoration of democracy after 1977, and especially after 
joining  the  EU  in  1986.  On  the  other  hand,  the  more  orthodox  practices  on  deficit 
financing  set  around  the  mid-1980s,  ending  in  the  explicit  ban  on  financing  by  the 
central bank after 1993, seem to be located at the very end of the sample. Accordingly, 
this  would  leave  an  insufficient  number  of  observations  available  to  detect  any 
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Ng-Perron tests for unit roots 
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       I(1) vs. I(0) 
  GLS Z M α  
GLS
t Z M  
GLS ADF  
bt  −11.62  −2.37  −2.40 
expt  −7.59  −1.85  −1.87 





* denotes significance at the 1% level. The critical values are taken from Ng and Perron (2001), 
Table 1. 
(ii)  The  autoregressive  truncation  lag  has  been  selected  using  the  modified  Akaike  information 




Estimation of a long-run nonlinear relationship between st and bt−1 
 
Error-correction coefficient   −0.21
* 
  (−3.84) 
Long-run coefficient    0.02
* 
   (2.75) 
 
Notes: 
(i)  t-statistics in parentheses. 
(ii) 







Kejriwal-Perron tests for structural change 
 
sup FT(1)  sup FT(2)  sup FT(3)  UD max  Number of 
breaks selected 
6.62  5.33  4.19  6.62  0 
 
Note:   No  test  statistic  is  significant  at  the  conventional  levels.  The  critical  values  are  taken  from 







Sims-Stock-Watson tests for Granger-causality 
 
H0  st → bt−1  bt−1 → st 
γ1 = 0  77.46
*  1.45 
α2i = 0    3.26




(i)  The reported values are F-statistics on the null hypotheses γ1 = 0 and α2i = 0, from the estimation 
of equation (7) in the text using st and bt−1 alternatively as dependent variables. 
(ii) 
* and 
** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
 